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The recent explosion of cybersecurity games not only reflects a grow-ing interest in the discipline broadly, but a recognition that these types of games can be entertaining as well as useful tools for out-
reach and education. However, cybersecurity game terminology—those terms 
used to describe or communicate a game’s format, goals, and intended audi-
ence—can be confusing or, at worst, misleading. The result being a potential 
to disappoint some players, or worse, misrepresent the discipline and dis-
courage the same populations we intend to attract. The year 2015 marked the 
second USENIX Summit on Gaming, Games, and Gamification in Security 
Education (3GSE), co-located again with the USENIX Security Symposium. 
At the event, we invited a community conversation about terminology for 
cybersecurity games. The conversation was the seed of a draft vocabulary 
report to be presented to the Cybersecurity Competition Federation for com-
ment and possible adoption. In this article, we summarize some of the issues 
arising from that discussion.
Cybersecurity competitions are growing in both popularity and diversity. The Web site 
CTFtime [1] reports that there have been an average of 56 events per year since 2013; this 
is over one game every week. The International Capture the Flag (iCTF) competition has 
seen participation steadily increase, with the past five years averaging more than double the 
participation seen in prior years. There are at least three separate US leagues where brack-
eted, regional play culminates in a national competition. DARPA’s Cyber Grand Challenge 
is the latest variation; it is “research in CTF form.” During DEFCON 2016, participants will 
engage in a technology demonstration in a game format. In the midst of this cybersecurity 
game renaissance, we see designers, organizers, and researchers facing a semantic gap when 
describing and discussing cyber competitions.
Some terms used to describe cybersecurity games are based on analogy, sometimes stretched 
to where the relationship becomes weak: capture the flag (CTF), Jeopardy-style, quiz bowl, 
etc. Other terminology is invented but without wide adoption and therefore still evolving in 
meaning: e.g., hack-quest, inherit-and-defend, hack-a-thon. Certainly, game format can be a 
deciding factor for players, who may be unable to participate in person for non-virtual events, 
may be unable to assemble a group for team play, or may be unavailable to engage in a full-
day, synchronous competition. Thus, at the very least, a common lexicon would help players 
and teams to identify competitions aligned with their interests and abilities. 
Generating such a lexicon is non-trivial, however, as players come to games from different 
backgrounds, with various motivations and desired outcomes [3]. Players may be novice 
learners seeking to build new skills or practice learned skills. These players may only want 
to play if they know solutions or write-ups will be released after the event. Others may want 
challenges to persist after the competition, allowing players to complete them outside the 
competition or present their solutions to a class or study group. Experts may want harder 
challenges to demonstrate skills for bragging rights or increasingly large prizes. 
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Taxonomies for Cybersecurity Games
No game on its own can possibly satisfy all the demands of every player. Imprecision in com-
municating requirements, outcomes, and mechanics means some players may not be able to 
identify games appropriate to their goals. To avoid player disappointment, competition Web 
sites sometimes identify both what they are and what they are not, clarifying where estab-
lished language is imprecise and terminology is confusing. The “capture the flag” term has 
become especially problematic within the community; it is a powerful descriptor for a wide 
audience but too broad for players seeking a specific type of game or experience. 
The two factors of cybersecurity games most frequently discussed, either explicitly or 
implicitly via comparison, are (1) whether the player will be either attacking or defending a 
network, service, or digital asset, and (2) whether the player will be attacking other players. 
While these factors are more easily characterized at their extremes, they can be imagined as 
a continuum, encompassing the dimensions of task variety and adversary dynamicity (see 
Figure 1). Task variety considers the types of knowledge, skills, and abilities players need to 
demonstrate during the competition. At one end of task variety are games that mix attack-
defend mechanics with a variety of domain-specific challenges, typically requiring a team 
due to complexity and scope; at the other end are games that focus on a narrower variety of 
skills, like service hardening or reverse-engineering challenges. At one end of adversary 
dynamicity are games featuring pre-created challenges, where the game adversary’s strategy 
is “baked” into the competition by the designer; at the other end are games where opposing 
players control the game adversary’s strategy, allowing it to be arbitrarily complex and highly 
dynamic. 
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Figure 1: A common but somewhat misleading characterization of cybersecurity games, which ignores a 
game’s intended audience, re-playability, and usefulness in an education setting—all identified as mean-
ingful qualities by the security game community. 
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Characterizing games along these two dimensions, however, 
may be overly simplistic, artificially constraining, and misrep-
resent the quality of the event. Indeed, we believe all the games 
identified in Figure 1 are fun, effective, and enjoyable to a variety 
of audiences. What’s more, our community discussion at 3GSE 
’15 highlighted that players care about many game attributes 
beyond these dimensions. Novice players want exercises that 
progressively build technical skills and self-efficacy in an envi-
ronment that is unintimidating. Instructors seeking games to 
complement the curriculum want challenges that highlight spe-
cific learning objectives and persist after the competition ends, 
allowing continued use in the classroom. Designers want to 
develop entirely new genres that share and play with traditional 
CTF ideas, without fear of mischaracterizing themselves. Nor-
mative, secondary terminology could acknowledge and highlight 
these features, when present.
One problem with characterizations of task variety is that 
they tend to perpetuate a false dichotomy between attack and 
defense. Some games designers feel obligated to limit them-
selves to defense-only skills or sysadmin skill building. This 
may encourage some players to participate, communicating that 
game skills are relevant to an accessible, well-defined profes-
sion, such as “network security administrator,” compared to the 
less understandable profession of “security consultant.” This 
may also be to avoid any impression of “hacker training” or oth-
erwise serving as a training ground for unethical skills. Limiting 
tasks in this way, however, likely underestimates the value and 
mischaracterizes the intent of offensive skills. As with all types 
of games, offensive and defensive skills are very related—some 
experts claim learning to attack is prerequisite to effectively 
defending. Learning to analyze and patch a vulnerable binary 
is, perhaps, an improperly structured version of the exercise in 
which one analyzes a binary, demonstrates how to exploit it, 
and then patches it. Further, characterizing games along this 
continuum may underemphasize essential technical and social 
skills exercised during the game, such as writing code in a team 
(e.g., Build-it, Break-it, Fix-it [3]) or reasoning about game-the-
oretic cost-benefit tradeoffs (e.g., 2011 iCTF’s point-laundering 
scoring mechanism [4]). 
The problem with characterizations of adversary dynamicity is 
that they tend to perpetuate the myth that human opponents are 
more dynamic, less predictable, and more skilled than the non-
player adversaries encoded in challenges. Automated systems 
can be dynamic and arbitrarily complex. The term “adaptation” 
is employed for games where the obstacle is changed to chal-
lenge the player at an appropriate level, creating an experience 
of flow. In contrast, player adversaries could be considered 
“poorly designed”: they can become distracted, become disen-
gaged, be offline for significant portions of the competition, 
be over-skilled (or under-skilled) compared to other players, 
etc. The systems performing in DARPA’s Cyber Grand Chal-
lenge are demonstrations, in some ways, comparable to IBM’s 
Watson competing on Jeopardy. Their performance may hint, 
among other things, at the potential for non-player adversaries 
in cybersecurity games. Perhaps, in the future, some of the most 
dynamic, educational, fun and challenging experiences may be 
Jeopardy-style “beat the expert system” competitions.
One factor of frequent discussion for cybersecurity games is 
their potential relationship to education and training. Orga-
nizers are certainly designing in such opportunities, despite 
the lack of appropriate terminology. The NSA’s Codebreaker 
challenge is one such example. It is a multi-month, online, 
Jeopardy-style, reverse-engineering competition where chal-
lenges are parametrized for each player. Correct solutions yield 
links confirming completion, making it possible for instructors 
to assign the challenges as extra credit and get proof of student 
achievement. 
One might try to develop a taxonomy characterizing the role 
of a cybersecurity game in instruction or its placement within 
formal educational curricula; however, to date, games have 
yet to evolve into full, online courseware. Instead, it may be 
more appropriate to consider cybersecurity games as “informal 
learning spaces,” like museums, libraries, and makerspaces [5]. 
They can be practice spaces for hands-on activities—opening up 
opportunities for tinkering, improvisation, failure, and shar-
ing—in an authentic yet safe environment. They can be enrich-
ing virtual environments with embedded opportunities that 
teachers may leverage, while avoiding the suggestion that games 
supplement instruction or shoulder specific classroom goals. 
Just as teachers need to develop strategies to adjust instruction 
to get the most out of a field trip, the same may be true for cyber-
security games. Those game designers seeking to curate such an 
environment may benefit from lessons learned by other informal 
learning spaces. For example, the idea of participatory experi-
ences and co-creative design may help designers evolve the game 
in response to individual and community goals [6].
While a community discussion about terminology may appear 
pedantic to some, it has highlighted some essential questions 
and core values about game objectives (which is, perhaps, a sepa-
rate and similarly controversial subject). The discussion dem-
onstrates the struggles our community faces when presenting 
new games to established players, designing games to reach new 
players, and interfacing with educators for use in clubs and class-
rooms. It further suggests missing research on who players are and 
what they need from the cybersecurity community. Ultimately, 
discourse that includes building a common body of terminology 
also will help us to be more aware of our values and goals.
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ASE and the Future of 3GSE
In response to the USENIX community’s interest in security 
education research, more broadly, the 3GSE workshop has been 
expanded and rebranded as the USENIX Workshop on Advances 
in Security Education (ASE), a new USENIX workshop designed 
to welcome a wider range of contributions to security educa-
tion research. ASE ’16 will be co-located with the 25th USENIX 
Security Symposium, to be held in Austin, TX in August. We 
hope to see you there!
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